Latest substantive UPC decisions

• HP had sought a preliminary injunction and further provisional measures against the defendants for alleged infringement of two of its patents.
• The application had to be served outside of the jurisdiction on the first defendant. Service was initiated in June 2025 via the  official online portal of the Central Authority of China. According to the portal, the documents were forwarded to the Supreme People's Court for further processing the following day. No further processing steps could be seen on the portal.
• HP asked the first defendant to voluntarily accept service by mid-September 2025. This was unsuccessful. Following this, HP requested that the Düsseldorf LD inquire as to the status of the service with the Central Authority of China. The Düsseldorf LD received a response noting that the documents had not been served as there was no company at the address provided.
• HP requested an order from the Düsseldorf LD acknowledging that the steps already taken constituted good service as per Rule 275.2 RoP.
• The Düsseldorf LD stated that it had complied with all formal requirements set out in the Hague Convention, to which the Chinese authorities did not object. The court held that HP had "credibly demonstrated" that the address provided for service was accurate and corresponded with the company's registered address.
• The Düsseldorf LD noted that Article 15(3) of the Hague Convention recognises that formal service requirements and associated time limits (in Article 15(2) of the Hague Convention) may prevent an applicant for provisional measures from having effective protection and therefore allows the ordering of provisional measures in urgent cases.
• In this case, all efforts to serve the application or otherwise bring it to the first defendant's attention had failed. As such, it was necessary to order that the steps taken constituted good service under Rule 275.2 RoP. Service was deemed to be effective as of the date of this decision.

• This decision concerns a dispute between Fujifilm and Kodak in relation to Fujifilm's patent for planographic printing plates. Fujifilm had requested an injunction, orders to provide information in relation to the infringement to be provided within twenty-one days of the date of service of the decision, as well as orders for the destruction and recall of the infringing products. Fujifilm also requested a penalty be set in case of non-compliance with the injunction and the provision of information only.
• The Mannheim LD found Fujifilm's patent valid and infringed by Kodak and issued an injunction with an order for the payment of a penalty in case of non-compliance. It also granted the order for information, recall and removal from channels of commerce, but no penalty order was issued in relation to those orders.
• In relation to the order to provide information, the Mannheim LD exercised its discretion not to set a deadline for the information to be provided or for a penalty amount to be set. It held that these points should be addressed, if required, in an application to enforce the order.
• In April 2025, Fujifilm uploaded an enforcement notice to the UPC's case management system and requested that the Mannheim LD issued a warning to Kodak that in the event of a breach or failure to comply with the order in relation to the provision of information after the expiry of three weeks following service of the notification, Kodak should pay a penalty of up to €30,000 per day for delay and/or non-compliance. Fujifilm also uploaded similar notices with respect to the other orders but stated that the time period for compliance should be one week rather than three. Subsequently, Fujifilm also filed an application for the imposition of a penalty and for an order to take a substitutive measure.
• The judge-rapporteur rejected Fujifilm's requests for a warning. On review, the panel also denied the orders.
• Kodak argued that Fujifilm's enforcement notices: i) did not comply with the translation requirements of Rule 118.8 RoP; ii) they were unclear and conditional on the warning that had not been issued; and, iii) the time periods for compliance were not validly set and were too short. It also noted that it was working to comply with the orders. The Mannheim LD rejected these arguments. It also rejected Kodak's request for confidentiality with respect to information ordered to be provided.
• The Mannheim LD did order Kodak to pay a one-off amount of €100,000 within two weeks from the date of service of its order for failure to comply with parts of its original order and an additional penalty of €2,500 per day for further non-compliance until 4 August 2025. For every further day of non-compliance after 4 August 2025, the penalty amount was set at €10,000 per day. Kodak appealed to the Court of Appeal.
• The Court of Appeal gave guidance on the interpretation of the system of penalties set out in Rules 354.3 and 354.4 RoP. An order or decision may include a penalty amount (Rule 354.3 RoP). Generally, a penalty amount should be included in the order or decision on the merits as this "enhances legal certainty". However, there is an exception to the rule that a penalty amount may also be issued separately in a later order but which relates to an earlier order or decision. Additionally, the penalty amount for non-compliance may be set by the court, considering the importance of the order in question. The amount should be "sufficiently deterrent to be coercive, but also within reasonable limits for it to be an appropriate (proportionate) penalty".
• The penalty order must also specify the occurrence on which the penalty order should be paid, for example, as a lump sum or (preferably) for non-compliance per a specified time period, per item, per act etc. A penalty order may also set a maximum amount of penalties that may be paid overall, but that does not stop the court increasing the maximum amount in a further order for further non-compliance, if required (Rule 354.3 RoP).
• The suggested penalty amount for non-compliance as well as the time period for compliance must be included in the claimant's application. It is incumbent upon the defendant to comment on the penalty amount and time period suggested by the claimant during the relevant proceedings. If the claimant has not included a suggested amount and/or time period, the defendant may still comment on what it considers reasonable and feasible.
• If no time period for compliance is contained in the penalty order, it is the responsibility of the claimant to set a time period within the relevant order. It then falls on the defendant to dispute the reasonableness of that time period immediately after notification – it should not wait until the time period has elapsed.
• When a time period is set by the claimant and the parties disagree, the court must determine the time period based on the parties' submissions as per Rule 354.4 RoP. The reference in Rule 354.4 RoP to "penalty payments provided for in the order" means that any order to pay any penalty sum in enforcement proceedings according to this rule must be based on a prior penalty order having been made.
• If the claimant alleges that a defendant has not or has not in a timely fashion complied with a penalty-reinforced order, a penalty does not automatically become payable. The claimant must request that the court order the defendant to pay the penalty sum. The penalty amounts and time periods in the order will generally be the basis for the calculation, but the court may deviate from that in favour of the defendant for reasons of reasonableness and proportionality, if required. The court will take into account factors such as the severity of the breach, its duration, and the defendant's ability to pay.
• The burden of proof that a defendant has complied with a penalty-reinforced order lies with the defendant.
• On the basis of these principles, Kodak's appeal was successful in part. As per Rule 354.4 RoP, any order for the payment of a penalty sum due to non-compliance requires a prior order reinforced by a penalty payment that has not been complied with. As such, the Court of Appeal held that the €100,000 lump sum payment Kodak was order to pay should be set aside as it lacked legal basis because it was not part of the original order.
• The other penalty amounts set by the Mannheim LD were upheld. The Court of Appeal noted that the Court of First Instance has a "wide discretion" in this regard and Kodak has not convinced it that the amounts set were inappropriate. If Kodak believes there are mitigating factors that call into question the amounts, these must be submitted and substantiated by Kodak and decided upon by the Mannheim LD in proceedings pursuant to Rule 354.4 RoP.
• None of Kodak's other arguments were upheld. Kodak's complaint regarding inadequate translation was rejected because the information concerned was not essential to the local enforcer therefore a translation was not necessary.

• This decision concerned an infringement claim brought by Wonderland against Cybex in the Düsseldorf LD in relation to its patent concerning a swivel locking device for a stroller wheel.
• Wonderland alleged that the challenged embodiment made use of features 1.4 and 1.6 of claim 1 by equivalent means, while the other features of the claim were infringed literally. In its statement of defence, Cybex contested the literal infringement of features 1.9 and 1.10.
• In its reply, Wonderland argued that if the court were to find that the challenged embodiment did not infringe those features literally, then infringement by equivalence would also apply. On the same day, Wonderland applied to change its claim to add an auxiliary request claiming infringement by equivalence in relation to features 1.9 and 1.10, in addition to features 1.4 and 1.6. Cybex objected to the application.
• The judge-rapporteur dismissed Wonderland's application, holding that Rule 263 RoP (leave to change or amend case) did not apply to the extension of the equivalence argument as it did not amount to a change in the nature or scope of the dispute. Therefore, Wonderland was able to make the arguments without amending its claim.
• Cybex requested a panel review of the judge-rapporteur's order as they believed the reasoning was disadvantageous to them. Cybex argued that the judge-rapporteur was wrong to state that all of the components of the attacked embodiment invoked under Wonderland's auxiliary request were identified in Wonderland's statement of claim. They maintained that the "cavity" and "clasping mechanism" targeted by the auxiliary request were not identified in Wonderland's statement of claim and that they appeared for the first time in Wonderland's reply to Cybex's statement of defence.
• Wonderland argued that Cybex's request for a panel review was inadmissible because Cybex was not disadvantaged by the order as the application was rejected.
• The Düsseldorf LD panel held that Cybex's application was admissible but unsuccessful on the merits. The panel upheld the judge-rapporteur's decision as it was based on the correct legal standard. An equivalence argument does not necessarily change the nature and scope of the dispute. The panel held that the judge-rapporteur had rightfully concluded that the fact that Wonderland seeks to claim infringement by equivalence for not only features 1.4 and 1.6 but also for features 1.9 and 1.10 did not alter the nature or scope of the dispute and therefore did not constitute an amendment of the case. The equivalence argument is still based on the same patent and directed to the same allegedly infringing products (namely, strollers with swivel locking devices).
• Cybex did not present any arguments to the panel that would have led them to reach a different conclusion on the applicability of Rule 263 RoP. The fact that the components affected by the extension of the equivalence claim were not designated as such (for example "cavity") in Wonderland's statement of claim did not mean that a different product was affected.

• This judgment concerned an infringement claim brought by HL Display against Black Sheep (a Dutch company) in relation to a system for securing shelf accessories to a shelf. HL Display's patent is in force in a number of states including UPC contracting member states (such as the Netherlands, France and Germany), non-UPC EU Member States (such as Ireland and Poland), non-EU Lugano contracting states (such as Norway and Switzerland), and non-UPC, non-EU states (such as the UK and Liechtenstein).
• Black Sheep denied infringement and claimed that the patent was invalid on grounds of added matter and lack of inventive step. Black Sheep clarified that its counterclaim for revocation applied to the designations from UPC contracting member states only and it was to be considered a defence in relation to non-UPC contracting member state designations. In addition, it confirmed to the court that no revocation claims had been brought in any of the non-UPC countries.
• On the basis of the CJEU's decision in BSH v Electrolux, the Hague LD assumed jurisdiction for hearing the infringement claims relating all of the patent's designations. As Black Sheep was domiciled in the Netherlands, it did not dispute the court's international jurisdiction, including its long-arm jurisdiction, or the LD's internal competence to hear the case.
• The Hague LD found that it was "clear" that the patent was valid. In considering added matter, the court applied the standard recently set out by the Court of Appeal in expert v Seoul Viosys. On this basis, the court concluded that certain allegedly omitted features of claim 1 did not amount to added matter as there was no inextricable link between the allegedly omitted features and the other features of the claim. The addition of a feature to claim 1 that was included in claim 2 of the original application was also found not have amounted to added matter.
• In considering inventive step, the court applied the problem-solution approach because this is what had been applied by the parties. This argument also failed. The court concluded that Black Sheep "had not showed any hint in the prior art given to the skilled person towards the claimed solution and is not able to explain why the skilled person would make [the modification claimed to be obvious]".
• Accordingly, the Hague LD dismissed Black Sheep's counterclaim for revocation with respect to designations in force in UPC contracting member states. For the designations in force in non-UPC, EU Member States and Lugano signatories, in accordance with BSH v Electrolux, the court found that there was no serious, non-negligible chance that the patent would be revoked by the competent national authorities and therefore it could proceed to determine the infringement claims. Again in line with BSH v Electrolux, for non-UPC, non-EU states the court made an inter partes finding that the patent was valid.
• The court also found the patent to be infringed, both directly and indirectly. Black Sheep had argued that HL Display had not sufficiently demonstrated that it had performed or was performing infringing acts. The court noted that before it considers the question of evidence, a statement of fact should first be sufficiently denied. It concluded that Black Sheep had not done this. In fact, it held Black Sheep to have conceded in its statement of defence that the infringing products had been "on the market within the territory for which [that patent] is valid since at least 2019". As a result of this concession, the court left it undecided whether the products were also offered on its website.
• In light of these findings, the Hague LD granted an injunction covering all states in which the patent was in force, which inevitably covered non-UPC EU and non-EU states.
• For more information on the jurisdictional aspects of this case, see our Insight here.

• Dolby and Sun Patent Trust filed infringement actions against Roku at the Munich LD. Roku filed a preliminary objection in both sets of proceedings and requested that the action be dismissed as inadmissible or, alternatively, that the proceedings be stayed for questions to be referred to the CJEU on the UPCA's compatibility with EU law. The objections were dismissed by the judge-rapporteurs. Roku appealed to the Court of Appeal..
• The Court of Appeal dismissed Roku's appeals.
• Rule 19 RoP contains an exhaustive list of preliminary objections. The Court of Appeal confirmed that a preliminary objection to the court's competence, including its international jurisdiction, is permitted under Rule 19.1(a) RoP. However, the Munich LD had correctly assumed that the requirements for international jurisdiction under Article 31 UPCA, in conjunction with Article 71a and 71b of the recast Brussels Regulation, were met in this case.
• Under Article 31 UPCA, the international jurisdiction of the court is determined by reference to Article 71a and 71b recast Brussels Regulation. Pursuant to Article 71b(1), a common court has jurisdiction where a national court would have had jurisdiction for a matter covered by the agreement establishing the common court. In this case, the agreement establishing the common court is the UPCA and the field of law is patent law, a field over which national courts had competence. As such, the Court of Appeal stated that Dolby and Sun Patent had "conclusively argued" that an act of infringement justifying the jurisdiction of the UPC had taken place.
• The Court of Appeal also confirmed that the argument that Article 32 UPCA (competence of the court) is not applicable can be a ground for a preliminary objection under Rule 19.1 RoP, but that was not successful here.
• The Court of Appeal was clear that, contrary to Roku's arguments, the allocation of international jurisdiction and competence of the UPC under Article 31 (in conjunction with Article 71a et seq of the recast Brussels Regulation) and Article 32 UPC do not constitute an interference with division of tasks between the CJEU and the national courts laid down in the Treaty on EU (TEU) or the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). The UPC is, as required by the CJEU, subject to appropriate mechanisms to ensure effectiveness of EU law. Accordingly, it was not necessary for the Court of Appeal to refer the question of compatibility to the CJEU.
• The Court of Appeal dismissed Roku's other claims. These included the argument that there was a violation of the right to a lawful judge pursuant to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and European Convention on Human Rights (which the court said would not be admissible unless it fell within one of the exhaustive grounds for objection in Rule 19.1 RoP) and that there was a violation of the right to a lawful judge due to the lack of a CD in London under Article 7(2) UPCA (the Court of Appeal noted that the Administrative Committee of the UPCA was authorised under the UPCA to determine that Milan would replace London as a CD).
• Lastly, Roku's request to pay a single court fee across both appeals was rejected. Fees are payable for each appeal even when the appeals concern the same issues.

This analysis is based on a machine translation of a decision not available in English.

• Philips is the proprietor of the standard essential patent (SEP) in suit relating to the Qi wireless charging standard. The defendants are companies in the Belkin group and include the managing director and various directors of Belkin companies (together referred to as Belkin).
• In 2019, Philips brought an action against the second and fourth defendants in the Düsseldorf Regional Court for infringement of the German part of the patent in suit. This was dismissed by the Düsseldorf Regional Court and the appeal was dismissed as inadmissible at the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court in 2024. Meanwhile, Belkin filed a nullity action with the German Federal Patent Court in 2022, which was dismissed in a (non-final) judgment in 2024 (appeal pending).
• At the UPC, Philips brought an infringement claim against Belkin in the Munich LD, alleging that the challenged embodiment fulfilled all the features of claim 20 of the patent and it sought injunctive relief in Germany, Belgium, France, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden. Belkin filed a revocation counterclaim.
• Philips was successful at the Munich LD against the Belkin companies – injunctive relief was granted, as well as the provision of information, damages and publication of the judgment ordered. The Munich LD also found the managing directors liable as intermediaries under Article 63(1) UPCA (rather than as "infringers"). The order prevented the managing directors from performing their duties in a way that resulted in infringing activities by the companies. In all other respects, Philips' claims were dismissed, as was Belkin's revocation counterclaim.
• Belkin appealed against the infringement findings, the dismissal of its revocation action and the findings against the Belkin directors. Philips appealed against the Munich LD's refusal to order product recall and against the decision relating to Belkin's directors, claiming that they should have been ordered to cease and desist, provide information about the infringement and pay damages.
• Firstly, the Court of Appeal dismissed Belkin's appeal relating to the revocation counterclaim, upholding the Munich LD's decision on claim construction. Notably, the Court of Appeal decided that statements made by the applicant during prosecution can be seen as "an indication of the understanding of the skilled person on the filing date". However, in this case, the Court of Appeal said that no other interpretation of the feature in dispute than that found by the Munich LD, which was supported by the Court of Appeal, could be inferred from Philips' statements during prosecution.
• Secondly, Belkin had sought to argue that the UPC was bound by the decision and reasoning from the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court (which had dismissed Philips' infringement action against the second and fourth defendants) in accordance with Article 36 recast Brussels regulation.
• The Court of Appeal held that Article 36 could not be applicable to Belkin International Inc as it had not been a party to the German national proceedings. The Court of Appeal, therefore, held that German law was decisive as to the legal effect of the national decision. It concluded that, under German law, the final judgment is generally effective for and against the parties and that the conditions under which res judicata is exceptionally applied to third parties were not applicable here.
• The Court of Appeal continued that, under German law, only the decision and not the underlying reasons would be binding. Article 34 UPCA concerns only the territorial scope of decisions of the UPC and therefore it could not be inferred from Article 34 UPCA that the UPC is bound by a decision of a national court. The court held that a res judicata decision of a UPC member state would preclude a decision of the UPC for the territory of that member state (i.e. here Germany in relation to the second and fourth defendants), but that does not mean that the UPC's decision excludes other UPC member states. Thirdly, the Court of Appeal upheld the Munich LD's decision that the Belkin companies infringed claim 20 of the patent in suit. However, the Munich LD's decision regarding the Belkin directors' liability as intermediaries was overturned. The Court of Appeal helpfully gave some guidance on who can be an "infringer" and who can be an "intermediary".
• The Court of Appeal noted that the UPC can issue an injunction against the infringer and against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party for the purpose of infringement.
• Article 63(1) UPCA does not define who an infringer is. Taking into account that Article 25 UPCA gives the proprietor of a European patent the right to prohibit third parties from carrying out the acts specified in that provision, the "infringer" within the meaning of Article 63(1) UPCA is taken to be the "main offender" or the "principal infringer", that is, the person who carries out the acts themselves. Thus, the court can issue an injunction against the main offender in accordance with Article 63 UPCA without them being aware of the patent infringement or at fault. Article 63 and Article 25 UPCA together provide patent proprietors with the ability to prohibit and immediately terminate the use of their invention by a third party without their consent. Only a third party who has direct or indirect control over the act of use is in a position to terminate that use and comply with an injunction.
• However, an "infringer" is also a person who does not themselves perform the acts in Article 25 UPCA, but to whom the acts of the principal offender are attributable because they are "an instigator, accomplice or accessory". Thus, an injunction can be ordered against a "co-perpetrator" as well. Complicity presupposes that the perpetrators "work together on the basis of a common plan of action". An aider or abettor who supports the acts of the principal infringer must not only be aware of the infringing acts, but also realise that those acts amount to infringement (i.e. be aware of the unlawfulness of those acts).
• On the basis of these principles, a managing director can be regarded as an infringer. But, merely holding the position does not make them an accomplice or accessory to the patent infringement. A claim against a managing director as an accomplice or accessory would be excluded if they have no control over the actions. The liability of the managing director depends on whether the acts under Article 25 UPCA are attributable to them as an instigator, accomplice or accessory.
• Knowledge of the patent infringement does not only require the managing director to be aware of the circumstances from which the infringement arises, but it is also necessary that the managing director knows that the company is committing patent infringement and (although possible and reasonable) they do not take action to stop it. The Court of Appeal noted that if the managing director obtains legal advice on the question of patent infringement, they can generally rely on that until a first instance decision establishing patent infringement by their company has been issued. A managing director would also be regarded as an infringer if their behaviour goes beyond the typical duties of a managing director, for example, if they were using the company for the purposes of committing patent infringement. In light of these principles, the Belkin managing directors were not held to be infringers as they did not have the necessary awareness of unlawfulness.
• Additionally, the Belkin managing directors could not be held liable as intermediaries because a managing director of a company cannot be a "third party" in relation to that company. As such, they cannot be an intermediary within the meaning of Article 63 UPCA.
• Next, Belkin unsuccessfully challenged the injunction against Belkin International Inc with regard to Italy, France and the Netherlands. Belkin International is the owner of the relevant website domains that advertised the attacked embodiments. The Court of Appeal held that this already constitutes "an offer" under Article 25 UPCA. The court clarified that the term "offering" in Article 25(a) UPCA is to be determined autonomously. Offering is understood in the economic sense and not based on the legal understanding in the sense of a binding contractual offer. The offer does not need to contain all of the details that would be necessary for the immediate conclusion of a contract.
• Lastly, Philips was successful in its appeal against the Munich LD's dismissal of its applications for recall and removal of the infringing products from the Belkin companies' distribution channels. Although the Court of Appeal acknowledged that recall and removal can be burdensome, that does not justify not granting the measures if the patent proprietor can expect further infringing use.
• Overall, the Court of Appeal amended the Munich LD's order to reflect that: i) the Belkin companies were ordered to recall and remove the infringing products from their distribution channels and destroy them; ii) the consequences of the actions of the second and fourth defendant in Germany were excluded from the decision because of the German national decision and the effect of Article 36 recast Brussels Regulation; iii) the imposition of penalty payments on the Belkin companies in the event of a breach of the decision/further infringement.

This analysis is based on a machine translation of a decision not available in English.

• Seoul Viosys (SV) is the owner of a patent relating to alight emitting diode (LED) (EP 698). This patent is based on a divisional application of a European Patent application (published as EP 320), which was also a divisional application of a European Patent application (the parent application or EP 598 A2). The parent application is the European regional phase of a Korean language PCT application. The patent in suit (EP 698) claimed priority from two Korean applications.
• SV started infringement proceedings in the Düsseldorf LD. expert filed a counterclaim for revocation. In response, SV filed various auxiliary requests. The Düsseldorf LD found that the patent could not claim priority from the two Korean patent applications, but, contrary to expert's arguments, it held that the patent did not contain added matter nor was it obvious. The court also found that the patent was infringed by expert.
• On appeal, expert argued that the Court of Appeal should annul the Düsseldorf LD's decision and revoke the patent. SV requested that expert's appeal be dismissed or validity of the patent confirmed on the basis of an auxiliary request.
• The Court of Appeal first acknowledged that the skilled person was undisputed. It then considered what the claim meant to the skilled person and went through the applications looking for the basis for the elements of the claim, applying the claim interpretation principles from NanoString v 10x Genomics.
• In interpreting feature 5.2 of claim 1, the Court of Appeal agreed with expert. At first instance, SV had agreed with the interpretation put forward by expert but changed its position on appeal, arguing that the Düsseldorf LD had been correct in its interpretation. The Court of Appeal disagreed, noting that the fact that Figures 24-26 only showed the opening within the mesa area would not lead the skilled person to any conclusion other than that there should be no further mesa between the outer opening and the edge of the substrate. The court noted that the skilled person would assume that the embodiment in Figures 24-26 was not covered by claim 1. This is particularly the case because the description did not discuss feature 5.2 in relation to Figures 24-26 and the patent also contained a number of other figures that, as the parties agreed, had nothing to do with the invention according to claim 1. On added matter, the parties agreed that claim 1 covered LEDs compromised of only one mesa. This was also the view of the Düsseldorf LD, which the Court of Appeal endorsed. In expert's revocation counterclaim, it argued that claim 1 went beyond the content of the original application as it also comprised embodiments with a single mesa. SV counterclaimed by pointing out that Figures 24-26 showed a further embodiment and disclosed the presence of a single mesa on the LED chip.
• The Court of Appeal gave clarity on the principles relating to added matter, explaining that:

"An inadmissible extension of the subject-matter exists if the subject-matter of the granted claim extends beyond the content of the application as filed. In order to determine this, the court must first determine what information the skilled person would derive directly and unambiguously from the entirety of the application as filed if viewed objectively and on the date of filing with his general knowledge. In this context, implicitly disclosed objects are also to be regarded as part of the content, i.e. those that are clear and unambiguous from what is expressly mentioned."

• It further added that in the case of patents arising from a divisional application, this requirement also applies to each earlier application. Thus, in this case, the subject-matter of granted claim 1 must not go beyond: "(1) the disclosure of the originally filed application of the patent in suit and (2) the disclosure of the original PCT application which has entered the regional phase and constitutes the patent application of the divisional application".
• The Court of Appeal's approach to the principles of added matter looks similar to the EPO's approach, although notably the court made no mention of the EPO's approach or any previous UPC decisions on added matter.
• Ultimately, the Court of Appeal held that claim 1 did contain an inadmissible broadening of the subject matter of the parent application as it covered embodiments (an LED with a single mesa) that were not clearly and unambiguously disclosed in the parent application. As such, the Court of Appeal overturned the Düsseldorf LD's first instance decision.
• Moreover, the Court of Appeal held that there was added matter even if an embodiment with a single mesa was disclosed in the embodiments of Figures 24-26 of the parent application because, based on the Court of Appeal's interpretation, feature 5.2 of claim 1 was not clearly and unambiguously disclosed in those Figures. As for SV's auxiliary requests, the Court of Appeal held that these all related to embodiments with a single mesa and therefore could not lead to a valid claim.
• In view of the invalidity of the patent due to added matter, the court did not discuss the further invalidity attacks raised by expert or SV's infringement claim. SV was considered the unsuccessful party and order to pay expert's costs for the appeal and first instance proceedings for both its infringement action and expert's revocation counterclaim.

This analysis is based on a machine translation of a decision not available in English.

• The judge-rapporteur of the Düsseldorf LD made a confidentiality order in accordance with Article 58 UPCA and Rule 262A RoP in infringement proceedings between the parties.
• The court classified certain details of the manufacturing process of the challenged embodiments of Menarini, information on negotiations between Roche and the manufacturer of the attacked embodiments (Sinocare), pricing and expected profits with respect to the contested embodiments, and certain portions of written witness statements as confidential information.
• Access was restricted to the Roche's legal representatives, four designated personnel, and witnesses and experts who require access for the purposes of the proceedings.
• The judge-rapporteur deferred the decision on what will be kept confidential during the oral hearing, the judgment and what should be disclosed to any third parties making a request for access.

This analysis is based on a machine translation of a decision not available in English.

• MED-EL had initiated infringement proceedings against the defendants in the Hamburg LD. The parties subsequently reached a settlement. As such, the parties requested that the court: i) confirm the settlement and that the decision may be enforced as a final decision of the court (Article 79 UPCA and Rule 365.1 RoP); ii) keep the details of the settlement confidential (Rule 365.2 RoP); and iii) not make a cost decision.
• MED-EL also submitted an application under Rule 262.2 RoP, requesting that the court order that the details of the settlement agreement shall be treated as confidential, and that the non-redacted copy of the settlement agreement shall not be published or otherwise made available to the public.
• Under Rules 365.2 and 365.3 RoP, the court may order that details of the settlement are confidential and that the decision with only a redacted version of the settlement is entered into the register. In this case, the settlement agreement contained confidential information and therefore the conditions for confirming the settlement and the inclusion of a redacted version in the register were fulfilled.
• However, following the Court of Appeal's jurisprudence, the Hamburg LD held that it would not decide on MED-EL's Rule 262.2 RoP request unless or until a request was made by a member of the public under Rule 262.1(b).
• The court confirmed the settlement and that the decision may be enforced as the final decision of the court. It also refrained from making a cost decision on the basis of the request.

• InterDigital issued an application in the Mannheim LD for an ex parte preliminary order against Amazon, which was referred to as an "anti-interim-license-injunction" (AILI) (a form of targeted anti-suit injunction (ASI)). InterDigital argued that, as holders of patents falling within the UPC's jurisdiction, it was entitled to file the application.
• InterDigital maintained that it feared that Amazon would file an application for an interim licence before the UK courts, which would prevent InterDigital from initiating patent infringement proceedings before the UPC. The requested injunction would prohibit Amazon from seeking interim licences, ASIs or equivalent measures that might prevent InterDigital from bringing infringement proceedings before the UPC.
• The proceedings were formulated to include a declaration that Amazon was entitled to be offered a licence to the challenged patents on RAND terms, and that InterDigital could be ordered to comply by way of an order for specific performance. Amazon is also seeking a declaration of licence terms including both substantive final RAND terms and interim RAND terms, adjustable pending the court's final determination.
• For the first time, the Mannheim LD granted InterDigital's application for an AILI. The court explained that InterDigital is entitled to assert its patent rights in the UPC and that includes enforcement of a claim for injunctive relief.
• The Mannheim LD stated that a declaratory judgment from the English courts would result in the parties solely submitting to the English courts for the global determination of the RAND rate. The court explained that the purpose of the interim licence declarations was to deter the SEP proprietor from initiating or continuing other parallel pending litigation concerning SEPs.
• In considering the usual requirements for provisional measures, the Mannheim LD explained that there was an imminent risk to its proceedings (by a possible interim licence application in the UK, which "in effects [sic] is equivalent to a prohibition on litigation"). It also held that the matter was objectively urgent as an application for an interim licence could be decided quickly by the English courts. InterDigital was also found not to have delayed in making its application for the provisional measures.
• The weighing of interests was also found to favour InterDigital because the court held that the effect of a declaratory judgment for an interim licence is aimed at preventing the pursuit of injunctive relief in other jurisdictions, including before the UPC. The practical effect was the parties would be persuaded to litigate the RAND licence exclusively before the English courts.
• The Mannheim LD explained that a party is "effectively compelled by the declaration to have its global legal dispute decided solely by UK courts in accordance with the rules applicable there and to refrain from enforcing injunctive relief in other territories in particular, so as not to jeopardize the UK proceedings." This was justified by the UK courts as stopping other courts from carrying out unnecessary work and therefore was not a violation of the principle of comity.
• The Mannheim LD held that this argument was untenable. The court explained that the UPC is bound by the case law of the CJEU and the obligation to enforce EU antitrust law. An interim licence declaration is an unacceptable encroachment that affects the patent rights of proprietors (which are constitutionally guaranteed in EU Member States) and the judicial sovereignty of other states. An interim licence declaration by the English courts may result in a SEP proprietor being de facto forced to accept an offer that is "at the lower end of the FRAND corridor or, depending on the amount of the implementor's offer, even outside it".
• The court continued that this must be considered in the context of EU antitrust law and, if an EU court – here the UPC, was prevented from carrying out this review, it could result in offers being contrary to EU public policy because "the granting of an interim license is not preceded by an examination of whether the competing offers are FRAND-compliant or not", which is a requirement of the CJEU's decision in Huawei v ZTE.
• Thus, if a mid-point between the competing offers is set as the interim licence rate, this could fall "outside of the corridor of EU law". Although the Mannheim LD noted that actual (F)RAND compliance can be determined subsequently, it said that the UK courts do not aim to do this as they consider it "desirable for the parties to reach a settlement under the pressure of the interim license". This may lead to the rate in the interim licence being a reference point for further negotiations, which, again, would be contrary to EU antitrust law.
• Lastly in the weighing of interests, the Mannheim LD noted that the order being sought was "exclusively defensive in nature and is intended to shield the proceedings before the UPC" and therefore the jurisdiction of foreign courts is not interfered with. It noted that the English courts are free to decide how the RAND rate is calculated and the consequences in the UK if a party fails to comply with the court's orders. If this leads to parallel determinations of RAND licences in different jurisdictions, then the Mannheim LD said that this "must be accepted as a decision of the litigating parties".
• The Mannheim LD granted the AILI and imposed a penalty of up to €250,000 for each day of non-compliance. The order was made immediately enforceable, but that would lapse if security was not provided by InterDigital within 20 days.
• According to Rule 213.1 RoP, InterDigital had a period of 31 calendar days or 20 working days (whichever is longer) from the date of service of the order on Amazon to initiate proceedings on the merits. Amazon was entitled to seek a review of the order within 30 days. The Mannheim LD has scheduled an inter partes AILI hearing for 14 November.
• In parallel German national proceedings, the Munich Regional Court also granted InterDigital a similar AILI.
• For more analysis of this decision and the response from the English courts, see our Insight here.

• Headwater brought an infringement action against Samsung in the Düsseldorf LD. Samsung filed a counterclaim for revocation. On 30 July 2025, the court dismissed the infringement action and revoked the patent in suit (to the extent of claim 1). Before the time period for appeal expired, Headwater withdrew its infringement action and requested that the parties bear their own costs. Samsung agreed to the withdrawal and Headwater's requested costs decision.
• Following the Court of Appeal's jurisprudence, the Düsseldorf LD held that an application to withdraw an infringement decision is admissible where there is no final decision in the action where there is a pending appeal. The same applies where the time period for appealing a decision of the Court of First Instance has not yet expired.
• Given the parties' agreement, the court permitted the withdrawal. Under Rule 265.2(2) RoP, and as per Headwater's request, the parties were ordered to bear their own costs relating to the infringement action.

• This decision from the Court of Appeal concerned an application by Apple to intervene in these proceedings between Sun Patent and various Vivo entities.
• In April 2025, Sun Patent brought two actions against Vivo in the Paris LD for infringement, claiming inter alia that the terms of a licence to the patents at issue offered by Sun Patent to Vivo are FRAND. On the same day, Sun Patent also filed an application for protection of confidential information under Rule 262A RoP, requesting that access to the unredacted version of its statement of claim and relevant exhibits containing "highly confidential information" be restricted to certain persons, including Vivo's legal representatives and, under certain conditions, no more than three Vivo employees. Sun Patent subsequently limited its request, asking the court not to allow Vivo's employees access and to limit the confidentiality regime to "external eyes only".
• The Paris LD restricted access to the highly confidential information to certain persons, including three Vivo employees and rejected Sun Patent's "external eyes only" regime request.
• Sun Patent lodged an appeal against the Paris LD's decision and Apple lodged an application to intervene in the appeal pursuant to Rule 313 RoP. Apple argued that the agreements between it and Sun Patent, submitted in the UPC proceedings, contained highly sensitive business information and that disclosure to Vivo's employees would be to Apple's commercial detriment and could lead to Vivo having an undue advantage. Vivo argued that Apple's application to intervene was inadmissible as it has no legal interest in the result of the proceedings.
• The Court of Appeal allowed Apple's application and admitted it as an intervener. The Court of Appeal followed a previous decision in which Apple sought to intervene in proceedings, holding that the RoP do not require that Apple has an interest in the final outcome of the proceedings. It is sufficient to establish a legal interest that Sun Patent's statement of claim and exhibits contain Apple's confidential information.
• Whether Apple's concerns regarding the confidentiality regime are well-founded and sufficient to grant the orders sought by Sun Patent was left to be decided in the appeal proceedings before the Court of Appeal.

• This decision from the Court of Appeal concerned an application by Apple to intervene in proceedings between Ericsson and ASUS.
• On 14 June 2024, Ericsson filed two infringement actions against ASUS, Arvato and Digital River Ireland (jointly, ASUS) at the Milan LD. ASUS subsequently filed a statement of defence for each infringement action and filed a counterclaim for revocation in each case. They also filed applications for protection of confidential information through a confidentiality regime.
• In response to the applications for entering into a confidentiality regime, Ericsson announced that it intended to submit one or more exhibits to the court containing information from and on licence agreements between Ericsson and third parties. Ericsson requested to apply an “external eyes only” regime in relation to the confidential documents submitted by ASUS, as well as to the documents to be submitted by Ericsson. This would have meant that access to these confidential documents was only provided to one expert on each party’s side and each party’s outside counsel.
• The judge-rapporteur established a confidentiality regime for the certain confidential documents, but rejected the adoption of an “external eyes only” regime.
• The Milan LD panel reviewed the judge-rapporteur's orders and dismissed Ericsson’s applications for review.
• Ericsson filed appeals against the panel review orders, requesting that the Court of Appeal order an "external eyes only" regime with respect to certain specified documents and to uphold the confidentiality orders in all other respects.
• Apple filed an application to intervene under Rule 313 RoP, requesting that the Court of Appeal allow Apple to intervene to support Ericsson because certain agreements contained highly confidential information relating to Apple. ASUS requested that the court reject Apple's application in its entirety.
• The Court of Appeal admitted Apple as an intervener. ASUS had sought to argue that Apple did not have an interest in the final outcome of the action and its interest in a "side question" was not sufficient. The court rejected this, noting that under Rule 313.1 RoP an application to intervene may be lodged at any stage of the proceedings by any person establishing a legal interest in the result of an action submitted to the court. Rule 313.2 RoP states that an application to intervene is admissible if it is made in support, in whole or part, of a claim, order or remedy sought by one the parties. The Court of Appeal held that these provisions do not require the applicant to have a legal interest in the final outcome of the action.
• In this case, the Court of Appeal found that Apple had a legal interest in the order sought as the confidential information at issue included information on agreements between Ericsson and Apple. The fact that Apple was a party to the agreements was sufficient for it to be admitted as an intervener.
• Whether Apple's concerns are well-founded and whether they are sufficient to grant the orders sought by Ericsson was left to be decided in the appeal proceedings before the Court of Appeal.

• On 22 September 2025, in advance of commencing a main action, OTEC made an ex parte application for provisional measures, namely, the inspection and preservation of evidence at Steros' exhibition stand at a trade fair that was due to take place in Hannover from 22-26 September 2025.
• Steros is a company in various technology areas, including surface finishing, marine robotics, high-performance electronics and medical technology. On its website, it advertises the "DLyte" series of electropolishing machines. OTEC had previously filed an application for inspection of the "DLyte Compact" series machine. This application was granted and the inspection took place on 26 March 2025 at a different trade fair. Following receipt of the expert opinion, OTEC filed a main action with the Düsseldorf LD on 12 June 2025.
• The present application concerned the "PRO500" machine. OTEC submitted that it was not possible to gain access to this machine during the previous trade fair because the product was not exhibited. OTEC further submitted that it was not reasonable to gain access to the "PRO500" machine by test purchase because it was priced at over €100,000 and its distribution channels were limited.
• The Düsseldorf LD found that the matter was urgent and that it was appropriate to issue the order ex parte because there was a demonstratable risk that evidence would be destroyed or no longer available for other reasons. OTEC had also "credibly demonstrated" that the patent was potentially infringed by Steros.
• Although Steros had previously filed a counterclaim for invalidity in response to the main infringement action, the court found that OTEC was not required to make further submissions on validity "[s]ince there is no clear indication that the validity of the patent in suit should be called into question". This follows the Court of Appeal's approach in Valinea Energie v Tiru & Maguin SAS v Tiru, where it held that for ex parte inspection and evidence seizure orders, validity does not play a role "unless the presumption of validity can be clearly called into question". In this instance, the court relied on the fact that there had been no negative decisions against the patent.

This analysis is based on a machine translation of a decision not available in English.

• In these ongoing FRAND proceedings, MediaTek applied to the Mannheim LD, requesting that Huawei produce a series of licence agreements that it had entered into with other licensees.
• Huawei opposed the application on the basis that these agreements related to network infrastructure products and not mobile devices, and therefore were not relevant to the dispute at hand.
• The judge-rapporteur found that MediaTek's application was partially justified and ordered Huawei to submit various licence agreements referred to in one of its statements. The judge-rapporteur stated that Huawei was permitted to redact the parts that it did not wish to use for its factual submissions or legal argumentation.
• However, the judge-rapporteur did not order Huawei to submit agreements with one anonymous counterparty. In exercising their discretionary powers under Rule 190 RoP, the judge-rapporteur held that it was not necessary, relevant or proportionate to order the production of the licences with this party at this stage in proceedings.
• In addition, the judge-rapporteur rejected MediaTek's request for Huawei to produce "all amendments and supplements to the licence agreements, any ancillary agreements and other agreements relating to the aforementioned agreements". The judge-rapporteur held that this request was too extensive and must be dismissed. They stated that the proper classification of Huawei's offer as FRAND-compliant or FRAND-incompatible appeared to be possible on the basis of the contracts ordered to be brought into the proceedings without this further knowledge because the licence agreements would allow "the status quo" of Huawei's portfolio at the time they were concluded to be compared with the current portfolio. This would enable an assessment to be made as to whether any relevant changes had occurred.
• A related decision can be found here.

This analysis is based on a machine translation of a decision not available in English.

• This Court of Appeal judgment follows a decision by the Milan CD in relation to a rare appeal against a refusal by the EPO to grant unitary effect to the applicants' patent concerning an ingestible biotelemetry device. The EPO had refused unitary effect after the applicants supplied an incorrect address for the University of Rennes, which the applicants failed to correct within the 30-day period granted by the EPO. The applicants appealed to the Court of Appeal.
• The Court of Appeal noted that the one-month period to correct the deficiencies in this case was non-extendable. Failure to observe a time limit at the EPO may, in certain circumstances, be the subject of a request for re-establishment of rights under Rule 22 of Rules relating to Unitary Patent Protection. However, Rule 22(6) expressly excludes this one-month period referred to in Rule 7(3) and, as such, applicants who have not complied with this time period cannot have their rights reinstated, regardless of the reasons for failing to observe the time limit.
• Accordingly, the Court of Appeal held that the Milan CD was right to dismiss the application to annul the EPO's decision.

• This was a procedural order in an infringement action brought by TRUMPF against IPG, in which IPG filed a revocation counterclaim.
• TRUMPF filed a duplicate reply in the revocation counterclaim and in filing its reply in the proceedings for amendment of its patent.
• IPG filed a request that parts of TRUMPF's pleading should be disregarded under Rule 9.2 RoP. It also argued that, in accordance with Rule 32.3 RoP, TRUMPF was only allowed to comment on the response to the request for amendment of the patent and no longer on the patent in suit as granted. The validity of the patent as granted was the subject of the counterclaim and not of the request for amendment. IPG maintained that TRUMPF's submission on the validity of the patent in suit as granted was late, which unduly hindered IPG's conduct of the proceedings.
• In response to IPG, TRUMPF requested its waiver of claims be admitted to the infringement action under Rule 36 RoP. IPG countered that TRUMPF's submission on the waiver of claims did not specifically concern the request to amend the patent.
• Under Rule 9.2 RoP, the court may disregard procedural steps, facts, evidence or arguments that have not been taken or submitted within the time limit set by the court or in the RoP. Rule 36 RoP also states that any pleading that goes beyond the pleadings provided for the RoP must be authorised by the court. As such, the court can exercise its discretion to disregard unsolicited pleadings beyond those provided for in the RoP and the content of pleadings specified in the RoP that goes beyond the content permitted under the RoP However, the court must also always take into account that the parties are required to present their arguments in full as early as possible in the proceedings.
• On IPG's application to disregard TRUMPF's submissions under Rule 9.2 RoP, the court exercised its discretion to take into account two sections of TRUMPF's submissions because those parts were not only relevant for the infringement action, but also for the revocation action. The Düsseldorf LD held that it was clear that these submissions were a reaction to IPG's submission in the reply to the revocation counterclaim within the meaning of Rule 29(e) RoP. In light of this, there was no violation of the principle of parties setting out their arguments in full as early as possible.
• However, in relation TRUMPF's waiver of claims, the court held these should be disregarded under Rule 9.2 RoP. It also rejected TRUMPF's request for admission of the waiver of claimed under Rule 36 RoP. In exercising its discretion under Rule 36 RoP, the court must take into account whether admission of a further pleading appears to be necessary for reasons of fairness, equity and efficiency as well as the right to be heard. The court was satisfied that TRUMPF had not explained which specific arguments of IPG made it necessary for a further written statement. Accordingly, the Düsseldorf LD rejected TRUMPF's application.

This analysis is based on a machine translation of a decision not available in English.

• Bellissa brought an infringement claim against Windhager and two of its managing directors, alleging direct, or in the alternative, indirect literal infringement of its patent concerning a bed edging with a lockable sheet-metal strip. The claim concerned acts in Austria, Germany and Luxembourg. Windhager counterclaimed for revocation for lack of novelty and lack of inventive step.
• In determining validity, the Mannheim LD found the invention to be novel and inventive based on the prior art. On inventive step, the court noted that it is not necessary to select a single starting point, and it is conceivable that examination of whether the subject matter of a patent involves an inventive step may involve starting from different points. However, the assessment does require at least one starting point to be identified to determine whether the invention would have presented itself in an obvious way to the skilled person.
• There must be a justification why the skilled person would consider the chosen part of the prior art as the starting point. In general, a second step requires a motivation or suggestion to proceed from the starting point towards the invention. Motivation may not be required if the use of a particular means was part of the skilled person's common general knowledge, the means at issue appear objectively expedient in the context and there are no particular circumstances that would render the use of the means technically impossible, associated with difficulties or otherwise inappropriate.
• Windhager did not state which starting point it chose for the assessment and did not demonstrate why the skilled person would be motivated to arrive at the subject matter of the patent. The court also held that it was not sufficient to demonstrate obviousness by proving the features of the claim individually in separate prior art documents without showing why the skilled person would be motivated to combine the documents in a way that corresponded to the subject matter of the patent in suit or why no specific motivation was necessary.
• In assessing infringement, the court found that at least two components of the attacked embodiment, assembled for their intended purpose, realised the features of claim 1 of the patent in suit. These components were advertised for sale on Windhager's website. The court noted it was irrelevant that the components were sold separately: the offering and sale of all components of an infringing product amounts to direct infringement under Article 25(a) UPCA, particularly as the website advertised that the separate components were easy to assemble.
• The Mannheim LD also considered the actions of Windhager's managing directors. Under the UPCA, holding the position of manging director is not automatically sufficient to prove liability in patent infringement. No submissions were made as to how the managing directors were involved in the infringement. The court therefore concluded it had not been established that the individuals were responsible for the infringing acts of Windhager. It was also left open as to whether the involvement of a managing director can be presumed in certain circumstances because no relevant circumstances were alleged or were otherwise apparent.
• Against Windhager, the court ordered a final injunction, recall, removal from distribution channels and destruction of the infringing products, the provision of information relating to the infringement, and a declaration of liability for damages. The court threatened Windhager with a fine of up to €250,000 for each case of infringement of the orders and measures ordered by the court.
• The infringement claims against the managing directors and Windhager's counterclaim for revocation were dismissed.

This analysis is based on a machine translation of a decision not available in English.