Latest substantive UPC decisions

• On 27 May 2025, InterDigital obtained an anti-anti-suit injunction (AASI) against Walt Disney in relation to ongoing UPC infringement proceedings. The ASSI aims to shield the ongoing UPC infringement proceedings from interference through foreign anti-suit injunctions (ASIs).
• Despite appearing in the main infringement proceedings, Disney's legal team declined to acknowledge service of the AASI. Notwithstanding this, Disney's legal team had informally notified InterDigital's legal team that its client reserved the right to appeal the AASI order to avoid costs.
• The Mannheim LD ordered personal service of the ASSI order via bailiff on Disney's legal counsel. The court noted that Disney could not limit their power of attorney to conduct the legal dispute before the UPC to individual acts that they choose and that they "contradict their own conduct when, on the one hand, they instruct their representative not to provide an acknowledgment of receipt, thus, in their view, thwarting the legal effect of the issued AASI, and, on the other hand, they nevertheless make statements regarding these proceedings that are specifically aimed at the performance, reservation, or waiver of procedural acts in the proceedings…".
• Furthermore, the legal representative for Disney was directly criticised for displaying conduct contrary to Rule 290.2 RoP and the Code of Conduct for Representatives (fair conduct of proceedings). The court warned that under Rule 291.1 RoP such a violation can lead to exclusion from the proceedings (including the main proceedings). The Mannheim LD confirmed that there had been effective service and Disney's legal representative was told to give acknowledgment within two weeks. The court noted that failure to do this or any further "disobedience" could lead to a €100,000 penalty payment being imposed.

This analysis is based on a machine translation of a decision not available in English.

• In a second set of proceedings concerning JingAo and Chint, this time in the Hamburg LD, JingAo commenced infringement proceedings relating to its patent for a solar cell (EP 759) against Chint and the other defendants.
• Chint lodged an application for security for costs, but this was dismissed by the judge-rapporteur of the Hamburg LD. Chint requested a review of this order, but this was dismissed by the panel of the Hamburg LD. The panel was of the opinion that Chint had failed to present concrete evidence that could support its allegation that enforcing a cost order in China would be impossible or unreasonably burdensome. The panel noted that the Hamburg LD has no experience in enforcing costs decisions in China and the experience of the national courts was not sufficient to prove Chint's allegation.
• Chint lodged an appeal against the panel's order, requesting that the Court of Appeal revoke the order and order JingAo to provide security for costs.
• The Court of Appeal granted the appeal, holding that the Hamburg LD had "exceeded the boundaries of its discretion" under Article 69(4) UPCA and Rule 158 RoP in finding that Chint had not presented sufficient evidence to support its allegation that enforcing the cost decision against JingAo would be unduly burdensome.
• In particular, the finding that (due to the recent establishment of the UPC) there is currently no experience with enforcing costs decisions in a particular country does not rule out the possibility that enforcing a cost decision in that country may prove to be impossible or unduly burdensome. The Court of Appeal held that JingAo having its registered office in a country outside of the EU or EEA was a relevant factor as there may not be the same guarantee of recognition and enforcement of judgments.
• The Court of Appeal also found it persuasive that Chint had presented evidence that enforcement might be burdensome in practice because there have been a number of UPC cases where the competent Chinese authority has failed to serve documents despite the UPC having fulfilled the formal requirements under the Hague Service Convention. JingAo was unable to present any cases where the UPC had been able to successfully serve documents in China. Taking into account the difficulties faced by member states party to the UPCA in serving documents in China, the Court of Appeal held that Chint had sufficiently substantiated its allegations.
• As such, the Court of Appeal revoked the Hamburg LD's order and ordered JingAo to pay €200,000 as security.

• JingAo commenced infringement proceedings against Chint in the Munich LD in relation to its patent concerning a solar cell (EP 541). Chint filed a revocation counterclaim.
• Chint successfully lodged an application under Rule 158 RoP requesting that JingAo provide security for costs.
• JingAo also successfully lodged an application pursuant to Rule 158 RoP requesting that Chint provide security for costs. The Munich LD granted the order against Chint but not the five other defendants in the infringement action. The judge-rapporteur left open the question of whether a party acting solely as claimant is entitled to request security under Article 69(4) UPCA and Rule 158 RoP. This was because the judge-rapporteur considered JingAo to be not only a claimant in the infringement action, but also the defendant in the revocation counterclaim.
• Chint lodged an appeal against the security order, requesting that the Court of Appeal revoke it and order JingAo to bear the costs of the appeal. In short, Chint argued that Article 69(4) UPCA does not provide a legal basis for an order against a party who is both the defendant in an infringement action and the claimant in respect of a counterclaim for revocation. Chint maintained that providing security would be an undue restriction for a defendant in an infringement action.
• The Court of Appeal ruled that the appeal against the order was inadmissible because it was a case management order issued by a judge-rapporteur (Rule 333.1 RoP).  A case management order can only be appealed if it has first been reviewed by the panel pursuant to Rule 333.1 RoP. This system is designed to prevent the unnecessary involvement of the Court of Appeal in circumstances where the panel of the Court of First Instance does not share the opinion of the judge-rapporteur.
• The fact that the judge-rapporteur expressly ruled that an appeal may be filed in the order, did not alter the Court of Appeal's assessment as the admissibility of an appeal was not at the discretion of the judge-rapporteur of the Court of First Instance.
• Chint had requested that the question of admissibility of its appeal be heard by the full Court of Appeal; however, this was rejected. A Court of Appeal panel may refer an action to the full court under Rule 238A RoP if the case is of exceptional importance and, in particular, where the decision may affect the consistency of the UPC's case law. The Court of Appeal concluded that this case was not exceptional and its case law on admissibility of appeals of case management orders issued by judge-rapporteurs was consistent.

• NST filed three patent infringement actions against Qualcomm before the Munich LD. Qualcomm filed an application for protection of confidential information under Rule 262A RoP in relation to specific technical and economic information to which NST had requested access in its infringement actions. The judge-rapporteur had granted Qualcomm's application, restricting access to this information to NST's UPC representative, two of its employees and one technical expert. The judge-rapporteur rejected NST's request to allow four US attorneys access to the information. On review under Rule 233 RoP, the Munich LD amended this order to include one US attorney.
• Both parties appealed the first instance decision – Qualcomm appealed to set aside the order so far as it included the US attorney and NST appealed to grant access to another US attorney. The Court of Appeal dismissed each of the cross-appeals.
• The Court of First Instance has a margin of discretion when deciding whether a particular person is granted access to confidential information under Rule 262A RoP and it is only for the Court of Appeal to set aside an order or decide afresh if the Court of First Instance disregarded legal principles in exercising its discretion. This was not the case here.
• The Court of Appeal held that the number of persons who can access restricted information should be no greater than necessary and that the parties should have discretion to choose which attorneys it wishes to engage to assist with proceedings. Here, NST failed to demonstrate that it was necessary for more than one US attorney to have access to the confidential information.

• Ballinno is the patent proprietor of a patent for a method and system for detecting offside play in football. Ballinno applied for provisional measures before the Hamburg LD. Kinexon and UEFA made a request for security for costs. The Hamburg LD granted the security for costs request, ordering Ballinno to pay €56,000. The court held that the facts pointed towards a risk of insolvency of Ballinno. It also took into account the fact that the patent had only recently been assigned to Ballinno before the UPC proceedings were commenced and many months after the assignor entered into pre-trial correspondence with Kinexon and UEFA. The court felt that this raised the concern that the purpose of the assignment might be to facilitate this litigation without financial risk to Ballinno. Ultimately, the Hamburg LD denied Ballinno's application for provisional measures and ordered Ballinno to pay the costs of the proceedings.
• Ballinno lodged an appeal against the security for costs order and the decision on provisional measures, but later made it clear it no longer requested provisional measures (the Paris CD had subsequently found Ballinno's patent invalid).
• The Court of Appeal upheld the Hamburg LD's decision to order Ballinno to provide security for costs. The facts before the Hamburg LD gave rise to a real concern that a cost order against Ballinno might not be recoverable by Kinexon and UEFA. The Court of Appeal noted that Ballinno did not bring forward any other evidence that negated this risk and Ballinno's SME status did not tip the weighing of interests. The Court of Appeal stated that the provision of security did not hamper Ballinno's access to justice, noting that national rules on security have been considered by the CJEU multiple times and have been held to be compatible with EU law.
• Prior to this decision, Ballinno had withdrawn its appeal on its request for provisional measures. This meant that this aspect of the appeal became devoid of purpose, there was no need to adjudicate on it and it was disposed of under Rule 360 RoP.
• It was not necessary for the Court of Appeal to examine the merits of this case to determine which party was unsuccessful and therefore had to pay the costs of the proceedings. The Court of Appeal held that if an action became devoid of purpose following a withdrawal of the main request by a party who took the inherent strategic risk that the urgent interest in the request could fall away before a final order was rendered, it was clear that if the request had not been withdrawn, the request would have been rejected for lack of urgent interest. As such, that party must be considered the unsuccessful party and consequently bear the costs of the proceedings. Accordingly, Ballinno was ordered to bear the costs of the proceedings on appeal.

• Headwater sued multiple Motorola entities and an alleged distributor for infringement of its patent (EP 069). Each of the defendants raised objections relating to the Munich LD's competence. The Munich LD rejected all of the preliminary objections.
• Defendants 1 and 2, both based in the USA, made a preliminary objection concerning the Munich LD's competence under Rule 19.1 RoP. The court dismissed these objections on procedural grounds as they were filed a day after the one month deadline for filing the objection.
• The objections by defendants 3 and 5 (defendant 4 having been removed from the case due to insolvency) were admissible but unsuccessful on the merits. The Munich LD's competence over defendant 3 arose from Article 33(1)(b) UPCA as its registered office is in Germany. The Munich LD had competence over defendants 1 and 2 also pursuant to Article 33(1)(b) UPCA because defendant 3 served as an anchor defendant, there was a business relationship between the defendants and the case concerned the same acts of alleged infringement.
• The court also found it had competence over defendant 5 pursuant to Article 33(1)(a) and (b) UPCA. The Munich LD found that there was a business relationship between defendants 1-3 and defendant 5 within the meaning of Article 33(1)(b) UPCA. Moreover, although defendant 5 was not part of the Lenovo or Motorola group, the court found that it was involved in the distribution of the challenged embodiments in Europe and that it had made a delivery of the attacked product manufactured by defendant 1 to Germany, bringing it within the scope of Article 33(1)(a) UPCA.
• In relation to Article 33(1)(b) UPCA, the court set out that the commercial relationship between an anchor defendant and its co-defendants must have a certain "quality and intensity". However, the court explained that this should not be understood too narrowly in order to avoid the potential for parallel proceedings with potentially irreconcilable decisions. Thus, being part of the same corporate group and being engaged in connected commercial activities such as R&D, manufacturing, sales and distribution was deemed sufficient to meet the business relationship requirement.
• The joint decision relating to the second defendant is available in full here.

This analysis is based on a machine translation of a decision not available in English.

• Alexion made an application to the Court of Appeal for a rehearing on the basis that the Court of Appeal's previous decision rejecting Alexion's appeal of the Hamburg LD's decision to dismiss its request for provisional measures was made by means of fundamental procedural errors. It contended that the Court of Appeal (i) applied a completely new standard for claim interpretation without providing proper opportunity for Alexion to be heard, and (ii) based its decision on incorrect facts.
• The Court of Appeal rejected Alexion's application. The requirements set out in Article 81(1) UPCA and Rule 247 RoP had not been complied with and the existence of a fundamental procedural defect had not been established. It continued that the literal wording of Article 81(1) UPCA makes it clear that a rehearing may exceptionally be granted only if the decision suffers from one of the serious deficiencies. A rehearing is not a regular appeal proceeding and it is not intended that mere errors of any kind can be a ground for an application for rehearing.
• The court stated: "[i]n order to qualify as a ground for rehearing, a procedural defect must be so fundamental that it is intolerable for the legal system and overriding the principle that proceedings which have led to a final decision should not be re-opened in the interest of legal certainty".
• It is for the court to assess the arguments put forward by parties and to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties. The court may make its own assessment of the weight that expert opinions and witness statements carry. It is for the court to assess the relevance to the subject-matter of the dispute and the need to examine witnesses named and requested to be heard. However, the court is not in general under an obligation to hear any of the experts whose written opinions have been submitted as evidence by a party.
• The court explained that interpretation of a patent claim is a matter of law. It is for the court to establish "what the skilled person’s understanding is of the terms used in the patent claim in the context of the patent claim as a whole and considering the description and drawings. In doing so, it shall consider and weigh the arguments and facts brought forward by the parties, including any expert opinions, freely and independently, however, without being bound by it." The court is free to make findings on points of law.
• The court stated that Alexion in essence did not agree with the conclusions drawn by the Court of Appeal. However, mere disagreement with the reasoning and considerations of the Court of Appeal and the outcome of the case was not a ground for a rehearing.
• The decision relating to the second defendant in the joint action is available in full here.

• Steros made an application for provisional measures (preliminary injunction) against OTEC for infringement of its patent with unitary effect, which protected an electric medium and electropolishing process using an electrolytic medium. Steros asserted claim 1 only.
• The Hamburg LD applied the test set out in 10x Genomics. The court found that it was more likely than not that OTEC had infringed Steros' patent. OTEC alleged lack of novelty, but the Hamburg LD decided that it was more likely than not that the patent was valid.
• Under Article 62(2) UPCA in conjunction with Rule 211.3 RoP, the court has the discretion to weigh the interests of the parties against each other. In this case, the Hamburg LD held that the weighing up favoured Steros. Steros did not wait for an unreasonably long time before bringing the application: the application was filed within one month of the publication of grant of the patent. It had the attacked embodiment examined at the end of 2024, prior to the grant of the patent, and it was not in a position to file the application before grant. The court also took into account Steros' loss of market share and price erosion. The preliminary injunction was granted.

• 10x Genomics brought an infringement action against Curio Bioscience in respect of its patent relating to the localised or spatial detection of nucleic acid in a tissue sample.
• The Düsseldorf LD provided guidance on claim interpretation. Claim 1 of the patent protected a method for the localised detections of nucleic acid in a tissue sample comprising of cells. From a functional perspective, the release of nucleic acid from an intact array may not be required for obtaining transcriptional information in accordance with the patent in suit. The court emphasised that the skilled person should not only take into account such functional considerations. The Düsseldorf LD noted that Article 69 EPC should not be understood to mean the claims are only a guideline and that the protection actually conferred may extend to what a skilled person would have thought when considering the description and drawings. The Düsseldorf LD reminded that that the claims define the scope of a patent's protection. In this case, the functional considerations could not be reconciled with the clear wording of the claim. Therefore, the clear wording of the claim prevailed and the court found that claim 1 was not infringed.
• The court also considered claim 14, which protected an array and was therefore a product claim. As it was a product claim, the Düsseldorf LD held that it was irrelevant how the claimed product was produced; rather the structure was the decisive consideration. On this understanding, the challenged embodiments made literal use of claim 14 and therefore it was infringed.
• An injunction and damages were ordered. Curio Bioscience was also ordered to recall and destroy the infringing products, and to provide 10x Genomics with information regarding the infringement (for example, information on deliveries, customers etc). The costs of this action and the prior interim injunction proceedings were to be split on a 30% (10x Genomics) / 70% (Curio Biosciences) basis.

• DISH sued various Aylo group companies for alleged literal infringement, or alternatively for infringement under the doctrine of equivalence, of its patent concerning a method for the representation of a rate-adaptive (data) streaming by Aylo's streaming services. DISH's patent had expired by the time of the oral hearing. Aylo counterclaimed for invalidity on the basis of lack of novelty, lack of inventive step and insufficient disclosure.
• Aylo had argued that DISH was abusing the law by filing multiple actions relating to the same acts and patents from the same patent family. For example, DISH had brought a patent infringement action before the Munich Regional Court the day before this infringement action relating to the same acts and another patent from the same patent family. However, the Mannheim LD found that this did not constitute an abuse of rights as a patent proprietor (or party able to sue) is free to decide for each of its patents that have not been opted out during the UPC's transitional period whether to assert them before the national courts or the UPC (Article 83 UPCA).
• At the oral hearing, DISH filed an application for a declaration of patent infringement. The court rejected this as an inadmissible extension of the action under Rules 263.1 and .2(a) RoP. The Mannheim LD stated that the application was not caused by the expiry of the patent and therefore by the cessation of the claim for injunctive relief. It held that it went beyond the original claim for injunctive relief because DISH was instead seeking a declaration of patent infringement.
• A declaration of patent infringement is one of the remedial measures available under Article 64 UPCA, but this is in addition to a claim for injunctive relief under Article 63 UPCA. A claim for declaratory relief therefore exists independently of a claim for injunctive relief.
• The court found that there was no apparent reason why the application for declaratory relief was only filed at the oral hearing. The Mannheim LD went further in noting that even if the extension of the claim had been permitted, the application for declaratory relief would have been inadmissible because DISH lacked an interest in the remedy. This was because Aylo sold their own products and, as the patent had expired, there would be no third party providers who would need to be notified in the form of a judicial determination to deter them from future infringement.
• Claim 1 of the patent as granted was found to extend beyond the application filed but DISH had submitted a number of auxiliary requests. The patent was found to be valid in an amended (narrower) form (that of auxiliary request 12).
• The Mannheim LD found that there was no literal infringement or infringement by equivalence. The court noted that there was some question as to which doctrine of equivalence should be applied and whether the UPC should develop its own doctrine or whether it should apply the substantive law of the UPCA contracting member states to the respective acts.
• The court stated that this did not need to be decided in the present decision and, irrespective of which doctrine was applied, equivalent patent infringement was excluded according to all equivalence doctrines or tests of UPCA contracting member states "if there is no technical-functional equivalence of the replacement means in the sense that the modified means do not essentially perform the same function to achieve essentially the same effect. To the extent that the same function is not taken into account, at least essentially the same effect is taken into account."
• The Mannheim LD concluded that there was no infringement by equivalence because the means of substitution were not equivalent means: they did not perform essentially the same function and did not have essentially the same effect. As a result of this finding, it was not necessary for the court to decide whether the means of exchange named by DISH were actually realised by the challenged embodiments.
• This approach to infringement by equivalence was different to that taken by The Hague LD in Plant-e v Arkyne. In this decision, the Mannheim LD said that The Hague LD had applied the principles developed in Dutch case law "without further justification, but with the consent of the parties". In what was perhaps a plea to the Court of Appeal to decide on the issue, the Mannheim LD stated that without a uniform approach to the scope of protection of a European Patent (both literal and equivalence protection), the UPC's aim of eliminating fragmentation in the European patent market would remain incomplete.

This analysis is based on a machine translation of a decision not available in English.

• Hurom brought an infringement action against NUC before the Mannheim LD. The Mannheim LD found that NUC had infringed Hurom's patent and ordered NUC, among other things, to destroy and recall the infringing products and to inform Hurom of the extent of the infringing acts, including information on:

i. product origin;

ii. distribution channels;

iii. quantities produced, delivered, and ordered;

iv. the price obtained;

v. manufacturing quantities and times;

vi. turnover; and

vii. the identity of all third parties involved in distribution.

• NUC brought an appeal against the decision and filed an application for suspensive effect under Article 74 UPCA and Rule 223 RoP. NUC claimed that the information it was ordered to provide by the Mannheim LD contained highly confidential trade secrets, for example the identity of its customers, and disclosure would cause irreparable damage. It also said that there was a clear risk of misuse of the information as Hurom could use is for its own strategic market positioning
• The Court of Appeal dismissed NUC's application for suspensive effect. The Court of Appeal noted that the power to disclose information of the sort the Mannheim LD had ordered NUC to disclose was enshrined in Article 67 UPCA in response to a justified and proportionate request of the applicant. The communication of this sort of information was necessary to ensure a high level of protection and it was only under exceptional circumstances that the enforcement of such measures could be suspended under Rule 223 RoP.
• The court highlighted that Article 67 UPCA mirrors Article 8 of the Enforcement Directive, which allows precise information to be obtained on the origin and distribution channels (including third parties involved in the infringement) of infringing goods or services.
• The Court of Appeal found that NUC had not substantiated the risk of irreparable harm or demonstrated that the appeal would become devoid of purpose without suspensive effect. The court emphasised that the communication of information was necessary to ensure protection and could only be suspended under exceptional circumstances, which NUC had failed to establish.
• The court concluded that NUC's interests in maintaining confidentiality did not outweigh Hurom's interests in obtaining the information to prevent further infringements. The Court of Appeal noted that there was no risk of misuse of the information because the order limited the use of the information for specific purposes, such as identifying third party infringers, calculating damages and verifying information obtained from the infringer.

• This decision concerned the alleged infringement of Tiroler's patent relating to pile driving tips by the manufacture and distribution of SSAB's attacked products. SSAB counterclaimed for revocation.
• Tiroler's patent was upheld in an amended (more limited) form and SSAB's challenged embodiments were found to infringe this more limited version of the patent in suit.
• SSAB tried to defend itself against the infringement claim by asserting that it was impossible to use the teaching of the patent using the challenged embodiments because the attacked tips fitted to drive piles that were outside the scope of the patent. The Munich LD held that if a defendant claims that patent infringement is impossible due to circumstances outside of the patent claim, the defendant bears the burden of proof under Article 54 UPCA. The patentee/infringement claimant is not required to make submissions on the design of components outside of the patent claim and therefore for an infringement claim it is sufficient that it demonstrates that all of the claim features are infringed.
• Ultimately, the court was unconvinced by SSAB's arguments, finding that it was irrelevant that, according to the SSAB, neither the piles marketed by them or other piles available on the market were sized in such a way to achieve a certain function when attached to the attacked tips. Here, the decisive factor for the question of infringement was not whether the drive piles manufactured by the defendants or others were dimensioned in a certain way; that was neither the subject of the patent nor  the subject of Tiroler's application to prohibit SSAB's behaviour.
• SSAB also tried to argue that the injunction granted by the Munich LD should be territorially limited to Germany, Austria and Italy as it said these were the only locations that the attacked embodiments were offered. The court said that this approach was misguided as, under Article 34 UPCA, decisions shall apply to the territory of the UPCA contracting member states for which the EP has effect. The court also ordered recall and destruction of the infringing products and damages, and permitted Tiroler to publish the decision in selected publications.

This analysis is based on a machine translation of a decision not available in English.

• On 26 August 2024, a standing judge in the Copenhagen LD had granted Hybridgenerator's ex parte request for evidence seizure and inspection against the respondents. On 4 September 2024, the standing judge set a penalty of €5,000 a day for each respondent who did not comply with the order. The respondents lodged a request for a review of the decision that penalty payment could be payable for non-compliance under Rule 197.3 RoP. The decision was upheld by the LD, again by a single judge. The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeal.
• The respondents' appeal was successful. The Court of Appeal held that the LD should have been composed of a panel when issuing the order. Rule 1.2 RoP sets out the powers that can be exercised by the President, the judge-rapporteur or a standing judge alone unless the RoP state otherwise. However, Rule 354.4 RoP states that adjudication of a request for the imposition of periodic penalty payments can only be done by the panel.
• The Court of Appeal referred the case back to the Copenhagen LD to decide on Hybridgenerator's request that penalties be imposed on the respondents.

• Esko is the proprietor of a patent relating to a method of curing photo-curable printing plates. It previously opted its patent out of the UPC system, but later withdrew that opt-out in August 2024. After the opt-out was withdrawn, Esko commenced infringement proceedings against XSYS before the Munich LD in relation to acts that were alleged to have taken place before and after the entry into force of the UPCA on 1 June 2023, as well as before and after the withdrawal of the opt-out.
• XSYS lodged a preliminary objection concerning the jurisdiction and competence of the court. It maintained that the action should be declared inadmissible as under Article 32(1)(a) & (f) UPCA. The Munich LD dismissed XSYS' preliminary objection and granted leave to appeal. It held that pursuant to Article 32(1)(a), Article 2(g) and Article 3(c) UPCA, the UPC had jurisdiction over the action without temporal limitation.
• On appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed that the preliminary objection was unfounded. It held that the UPC has competence to hear infringement claims from before the court began operations. It also found that the UPC is competent for the opt-out phase if the opt-out has been successfully withdrawn.
• As for acts occurring before the start of the court's operations, the Court of Appeal stated that Article 32(1) UPCA does not provide for a temporal limitation on the exclusive competence of the court concerning acts of alleged infringement. Nor do Articles 1 and 3 UPCA suggest a limitation. The Court of Appeal noted that this reflected the object and purpose of the UPCA, which is to create a common court to prevent the difficulties caused by a fragmented European market for patents.
• The Court of Appeal further stated that the UPC having competence for acts of infringement occurring before the UPCA entered into force does not contradict the principle of non-retroactivity under international law. The court had applied the relevant applicable provision on the court's competence (Article 32 UPCA) and that did not raise the question of retroactivity.
• In relation to the UPC's competence for the opt-out period when an opt-out has been withdrawn, the Court of Appeal held that withdrawal of an opt-out brings the patent back under the competence of the court. The provisions on withdrawal do not provide for partial or limited withdrawals. Again, a different approach would counteract the purpose of the UPCA and lead to a fragmented system.

• This decision concerned costs assessments and time limits. Cisco requested an extension of the deadline to submit a cost assessment application under Rule 151 RoP, which was initially missed due to an oversight in docketing the deadline by its legal team.
• Cisco argued that the missed deadline was due to an error by a reliable legal secretary who failed to note the deadline in their tracking system. It highlighted that its law firm had a robust system for monitoring deadlines, including a four-eyes principle where deadlines are checked by two staff members. Despite this, the deadline was not recorded, and Cisco only became aware of the issue when the opposing party submitted its cost assessment application. Cisco requested a retroactive extension under Rule 9.3(a) RoP or alternatively sought re-establishment of rights under Rule 320 RoP.
• The Hamburg LD rejected Cisco's request for a retroactive extension of the deadline. It explained that while Rule 9.3(a) RoP allows for deadlines to be extended retroactively, this applies only to decisions made on timely filed extension requests. Since the request was made after the deadline had passed, it could not be granted.
• The Hamburg LD was clear that if a time limit provided for in the RoP or set by the Court of First Instance has been missed, a party has no choice but to file an application for re-establishment of rights under Rule 320 RoP (provided that none of the non-extendable time limits are affected). Under Rule 320.1 RoP, the court may grant re-establishment of rights to a party who, despite all due care, has failed to meet a time limit under the RoP or set by the Court of First Instance for a reason beyond their control and they have lost a right or an appeal as a direct consequence.
• The exact meaning of "all due care" and what amounts to a reason beyond their control is not set out in the RoP. The Hamburg LD held that these terms must be interpreted autonomously (that is, without reference to German law, the practice of the EPO or the case law of the CJEU). Therefore, "all due care" is generally observed if the party has taken all reasonable precautionary steps to comply with the deadline. In terms of circumstances outside of a party's control, the court will deem the conduct of a party's representative to be attributed to the party. This means that a lack of supervision, instruction or selection of salaried employees can also be attributed as conduct of the party without all due care.
• In this instance, the Hamburg LD did grant Cisco's request for re-establishment, acknowledging that that it had taken reasonable precautions to avoid any errors. As a result, Cisco was allowed to proceed with its cost assessment application despite the initial oversight. The court emphasised the importance of maintaining a diligent system for tracking deadlines but recognised that errors can occur even in well-monitored systems.

This analysis is based on a machine translation of a decision not available in English.

• This decision concerned the review of an order for preservation of evidence and inspection under Rule 197.3 RoP. Nanoval had applied for, and the Munich LD ordered, measures to preserve evidence (saisie) and an inspection pursuant to Rule 192 RoP et seq.
• In requesting a review of the order, ALD Vacuum argued that the order should be annulled because i) Nanoval had not demonstrated a likelihood of patent infringement and ii) proof of the risk of a loss of evidence had not been provided.
• The Munich LD dismissed ALD Vacuum's request for annulment, holding that Nanoval had submitted all the evidence reasonably available to it to substantiate the allegation of infringement in accordance with Article 60 UPCA.
• The court held that ALD Vacuum had wrongly based its arguments to overturn the order on the risk of evidence destruction. However, according to Article 60(5) UPCA, the risk of evidence destruction is a reason for ordering the measures without hearing the other party. Conversely, Article 60(6) UPCA and Rule 197 RoP provide for a review of an order when the other party has not been heard and the possible destruction of evidence does not play a role in that review: the examination is solely whether the measures were rightly ordered.
• ALD Vacuum also argued that the fact it had deposited a protective letter was assessed by the court as a "lack of willingness to cooperate", which the Munich LD found to be incorrect. The court reminded the parties that the right to file a protective letter and therefore to defend oneself pre-emptively against a possible infringement allegation must not be seen as a disadvantage to the party filing it. It confirmed that the court did not do so and concluded a lack of willingness to cooperate from the apparently deliberate exclusion of appropriate information that meant an inspection could have been avoided.
• ALD Vacuum's review application was rejected and the evidence preservation and inspection order was maintained.

This analysis is based on a machine translation of a decision not available in English.

• This decision related to a revocation action brought by Aylo in relation to the German designation of a European Patent claiming adaptive-rate content streaming and a method for streaming videos from servers for playback on a content player.
• There was a parallel infringement action relating to the same patent in the German Regional Court Munich but the decision was not available at the time the Paris CD gave its judgment. Opposition proceedings before the EPO were also pending, with a non-binding preliminary opinion having been given prior to the Paris CD's decision. DISH Technologies had requested a stay of these proceedings pending the Opposition Division's decision. The court declined to do so, noting that Aylo's interest in obtaining a timely judgment from the Paris CD and the advanced stage of proceedings outbalanced DISH's interests.
• On a procedural point, the court decided that it was entitled to, if requested, limit the scope of revocation of a European Patent to national parts validated in individual UPC members states (in this case, Germany). Article 34 UPCA sets out the general rule that decisions of the UPC shall cover the territory of the UPCA contracting member states in which a European Patent has effect. The Paris CD clarified that this provision defines the possible scope of UPC judgment but does not restrain the possibility of limiting the revocation of a European Patent to certain UPCA contracting member states.
• The court applied Abbott v Sibio and found that the patent was invalid for added matter. In particular, it found that feature 1.7 (which required "requesting streamlets of the highest quality one of the copies determined sustainable at that time") extended beyond the content of the parent application. Consequently, the court revoked the German part of the patent in issue.
• DISH submitted a series of auxiliary requests, but these were incapable of overcoming the grounds of invalidity with respect to feature 1.7.

• This decision on the merits related to the alleged infringement of a patent owned by Hurom concerning a juice-squeezing module for a juicer. The patent is in force in Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and the UK (although this infringement action did not cover the UK). NUC counterclaimed for revocation. In response, Hurom rejected the revocation arguments and filed an application to unconditionally amend the patent, along with an auxiliary request to amend the patent to address the grounds of invalidity.
• NUC claimed that the patent as unconditionally amended by Hurom was invalid due to added matter based on an unallowable intermediate generalisation. However, the Paris LD disagreed. The court found that NUC's argument that eight features were inextricably linked was unfounded because NUC had not demonstrated the link. Furthermore,  the skilled person would understand that, when the patent describes an embodiment, some features may be used to illustrate how it works without necessarily being an essential part of the invention (for example, the shaft gear).
• NUC also alleged lack of inventive step, which was successful. Claims 1 to 6 as unconditionally amended, as well as claims 1 to 3 as amended in the auxiliary request of the Dutch, French, German and Italian parts were held to lack inventive step.
• Hurom requested that the court rule on an injunction and remedies concerning infringement in Poland on the basis of the patent as granted. NUC objected, stating that the UPC lacked jurisdiction under Article 34 UPCA (territorial scope of decisions). Hurom responded that NUC's objection should have been raised as a preliminary objection pursuant to Rule 19 RoP within one month of the service of the statement of claim and therefore was late and should be declared inadmissible. In any event, Hurom maintained that the UPC has territorial jurisdiction over Poland in accordance with the recast Brussels Regulation.
• The Paris LD held that the dispute did concern the territorial scope of the UPC's decisions, which does not fall under the scope of Rule 19 RoP, which is limited to the jurisdiction and competence of the UPC, the competence of a division, and the language of the statement of claim. As such, NUC's objection based on Article 34 UPCA was admissible, but it was ultimately dismissed.
• Hurom's claim concerning alleged acts of infringement in Poland was admissible in light of the CJEU's decision in BSH v Electrolux. However, on the merits, Hurom had the burden of proof of the alleged facts. No facts concerning the alleged infringement had been introduced. Thus, Hurom's claim concerning Poland was dismissed as it was not well-founded.